Probability ratio and likelihood ratio measures of inductive support and related notions have appeared as theoretical tools for probabilistic approaches in the philosophy of science, the psychology of reasoning, and artificial intelligence. In an effort of conceptual clarification, several authors have pursued axiomatic foundations for these two families of measures. Such results have been criticized, however, as relying on unduly demanding or poorly motivated mathematical assumptions. We provide two novel theorems showing that probability ratio and likelihood ratio measures can be axiomatized in a way that overcomes these difficulties.
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Introduction
In what follows, we will denote the quantity below as the probability ratio:
PðhjeÞ PðhÞ
To ensure mathematical definiteness, we will assume throughout that h and e are contingent statements and P is a regular probability function (so that 0 < P(h), P(e) < 1).
From Keynes ([1921] , pp. 165ff) to Kuipers ([2000] , pp. 49ff), the probability ratio, or strictly increasing functions of it, have often been said to measure the degree of inductive support or confirmation that evidence e provides to hypothesis h. Similarly, the probability ratio has been employed to characterize the strength of inductive arguments in the psychological study of human Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 64 (2013), 189-204 reasoning (see Viale and Osherson [2000] ; Lo et al. [2002] , p. 186), with e and h denoting premise and conclusion, respectively. Further, probability ratio measures have been invoked to quantify the explanatory power of hypothesis h with regards to datum e (Popper [1954], p. 147; McGrew [2003] ), the severity of e as a (positive) test of hypothesis h (Popper [1963] , p. 526), the amount of information transmitted by statement e relative to statement h (Hintikka [1968] ), and the degree of coherence between statements e and h (Shogenji [1999] ; Schupbach [2011] ). Moreover, the notion of relative change in risk as employed in epidemiology also amounts to a probability ratio measure. 1 On the other hand, we will denote the following quantity as the likelihood ratio:
PðejhÞ Pðej:hÞ
The likelihood ratio, and strictly increasing functions of it, have no less a remarkable historical record than probability ratio measures. As reported by Irving John Good, the likelihood ratio was crucially employed by Alan Turing in a 'vital cryptanalytic application' during the Second World War and said to quantify 'the factor in favour of h provided by e' (Good [1985] , p. 252; also see Good [1950] , pp. 62-3). Likelihood ratio measures have since been used to explicate or represent a number of related notions, namely, weight of evidence (Good [1950] ; Minsky and Selfridge [1961] ), belief change (Heckerman [1988] ), corroboration (Good [1960] , [1968] ), and once again support or confirmation (for example, Kemeny and Oppenheim [1952] ; Watanabe [1969] , p. 374; Fitelson [2001] ), as well as inductive argument strength (Oaksford and Hahn [2007] , pp. 286 ff; also see Tenenbaum and Griffiths [2001] ). Likelihood ratio measures have also played a central role in the definition and interpretation of some classical expert systems (Duda et al. [1976] ; Heckerman [1986] ; Heckerman and Shortliffe [1992] ) as well as in other areas of artificial intelligence (for example, Dembczynski et al. [2007] ). According to Fitelson and Hitchcock ([2011] ), the likelihood ratio reflects a measure of causal strength in the spirit of Lewis ([1986] ) (with h and e here denoting an antecedent causal factor and an associated subsequent event, respectively). Finally, the likelihood ratio occurs as a summary measure of the diagnostic value of a test result in the medical literature (Deeks and Altman [2004] ) and as a measure of the probative value of a datum in legal reasoning and forensic science (Kaye and Koehler [2003] ; Taroni et al. [2006] ).
1 To see why, let P(h) be the so-called control event rate and P(hje) the event rate on e (the latter being a relevant experimental intervention or environmental exposure). The standard definition of relative change in risk (increase/reduction) becomes (P(hje) À P(h))/P(h) (see, for example, Barratt et al. [2004] ), which is a simple increasing function of the probability ratio, namely, P(hje)/P(h) À 1.
Seeking theoretical clarification, a natural goal is to axiomatize these two families of measures, i.e. to identify conditions that are necessary and sufficient to single out each of them as capturing a target notion. Indeed, various results of this kind have been presented. For our purposes, Heckerman ([1988] ) provides a useful starting point. Heckerman was following Cox ([1946] ), who derived probability as an essentially unique quantitative representation that fulfilled a few axioms held to characterize belief. In the attempt to provide a parallel result concerning probabilistic change in belief (or belief update), here labelled C(h, e), Heckerman offered an axiomatic foundation of likelihood ratio measures involving the following principle:
(H) P(hje) is a continuous function of C(h, e) and P(h) only, and is increasing in each argument when the other is held constant.
If P is required to range over a continuous interval, however, its domain must also be non-denumerable. As a consequence, Heckerman's ([1988] ) theorem does not cover as simple a case as, say, a well-specified urn setting. This point was forcefully noted by Halpern ([1999] ), who traced the problem back to Cox ([1946] ) himself. According to Fitelson ([2006] ), the same difficulty afflicts two further contributions that are rather well-known in the philosophy of science, i.e. Good's ([1960] ) earlier axiomatic derivation of likelihood ratio measures for the weight of evidence (also see Good [1968] , [1984] ) and Milne's ([1996] ) derivation of the log probability ratio measure for confirmation. In fact, a common trait of all these contributions is the reliance on certain properties of functional equations (see Aczel [1966] ) which presuppose the functions involved to be continuous. A possible resolution had been envisaged by Halpern ([1999] ) himself: in order to defend the technical assumptions needed, one might emphasize that the function representing belief (or change in belief, for that matter) has to 'apply uniformly to all domains' (p. 80). In Huber's ([2008] ) view, for instance, this line of argument would make continuity assumptions such as those in Milne ([1996] ) 'perfectly reasonable ' (p. 419) . Be that as it may, they still would 'have no intuitive connection to material desiderata for inductive logic', as Fitelson ([2006] ) pointed out (p. 506, fn 12).
Here we argue that the above difficulty can be overcome altogether. As we will show, probability ratio and likelihood ratio measures can be axiomatized just by means of principles that are philosophically significant while mathematically undemanding, with no need for the domain of the probability function to be non-denumerable. Most of the points summarized above arose in discussions of probabilistic measures of confirmation, and we will also adopt the same framework for our presentation. However, this does not prevent our results and their consequences from being exploited in other contexts (for example, probabilistic measures of explanatory power, coherence, causal strength, and so on).
Axioms for Probability Ratio Measures
Let L be a propositional language and L c the set of the contingent formulae in L, i.e. those expressing neither logical truths nor logical falsehoods. Further, let P be the set of all regular probability functions that can be defined over L. Each element P 2 P can thus be seen as representing a possible (non-dogmatic, see Howson [2000] , p. 70) state of belief concerning a domain described in L. In order to run our argument, we will need to explicitly represent the dependence of confirmation on a given probability distribution, thus positing C: {L c Â L c Â P} ! R and adopting the notation C P (h, e), with h, e 2 L c .
2 Our first axiom is as follows:
There exists a function g such that, for any h, e 2 L c and any P 2 P,
Note that the probability distribution over the algebra generated by h and e is entirely determined by P(h^e), P(h) and P(e). So A0 simply states that C P (h, e) depends on that distribution, and nothing else. This is a widespread (albeit often tacit) assumption in discussions of confirmation in a probabilistic framework. Under slightly different renditions, it is also explicitly subscribed to by both Good ([1960 Good ([ ], p. 322, [1968 , pp. 127-8) and Milne ([1996] , p. 21). The label formality is drawn from Tentori et al. ([2007] , [2010] ). Now consider the following:
A1. Final probability incrementality.
For any h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and any P 2 P, C P (h, e 1 ) x C P (h, e 2 ) iff P(hje 1 ) x P(hje 2 ).
A2. Law of likelihood.
For any h 1 , h 2 , e 2 L c and any
A1 is closely related to the homonymous condition in , pp. 77-9), there identified as describing a very basic property of the Bayesian notion of confirmation. The principle appears under the label 'law of conditional probability' in Hájek and Joyce ([2008] , p. 122). The right-to-left part of the biconditional also occurs in Steel ([2003] , pp. 219-21) (who provides a few further references) and in Eells and Fitelson ([2000] , p. 670), who remark: 'it is not an exaggeration to say that most Bayesian confirmation theorists' would accept it 'as a desideratum for Bayesian measures of confirmation' (see Fitelson [2006] , p. 506, for yet another occurrence and a similar comment). As Eells and Fitelson ([2000] ) further point out, the principle is crucially involved in classical Bayesian analyses such as the solution of the ravens paradox offered by Horwich ([1982] , pp. 54-63). A2 is endorsed by both Edwards ([1972] , pp. 30-1) and Milne ([1996] ). The label 'law of likelihood' goes back to Hacking ([1965] ) and also occurs in Hájek and Joyce ([2008] , p. 122) as well as in , pp. 82-3). The following can be proved (essentially the same theorem was anticipated in Chater and Oaksford [2008, unpublished] 
Theorem 1 A0-A2 iff there exists a strictly increasing function, f, such that C P ðh, eÞ ¼ f PðhjeÞ PðhÞ .
A proof of Theorem 1 is provided in the Appendix.
Axioms for Likelihood Ratio Measures
In the set of axioms below, A2 has been replaced by a different statement A2*:
There exists a function g such that, for any h, e 2 L c and any P 2 P, C P h, e ð Þ ¼ g Pðh^eÞ, P h ð Þ, P e ð Þ ð Þ :
For any h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and any P 2 P, C P (h, e 1 ) x C P (h, e 2 ) iff P(hje 1 ) x P(hje 2 ). A2*. Modularity (for conditionally independent data).
For any h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and any P 2 P, if P(e 1 j±h^e 2 ) ¼ P(e 1 j±h), then
The notion of conditional confirmation in A2* is meant as usual, i.e. with all the relevant values from P being conditionalized on e 2 . The label for A2* is freely adapted after Heckerman ([1988], pp. 18-19) . The same principle also appears in Good ([1968] , p. 134) and Fitelson ([2001] , p. S130).
The following can be shown:
Theorem 2 A0-A2* iff there exists a strictly increasing function, f, such that C P ðh, eÞ ¼ f PðejhÞ Pðej:hÞ :
A proof of Theorem 2 is also provided in the Appendix. Heckerman's ([1988] ) main result closely resembles Theorem 2, but with his demanding principle (H) above instead of A1. The connection between A1 and (H) is thus of particular interest here. On the one hand, as we already know, A1 does not require any continuous probability function and thus no commitment to a non-denumerable domain. But A1 does convey one core philosophical tenet of (H), i.e. that for any hypothesis, h, posterior and confirmation always move in the same direction in the light of data, e. As pointed out above, this seems intuitively compelling, and certainly so within a Bayesian perspective.
Discussion
While we confined full-fledged proofs to the Appendix, an informal overview of the proof strategy involved might be of interest, in that it indirectly elucidates how functional equations and continuity assumptions can be dispensed with. 4 The left-to-right implication for the probability ratio case (i.e. Theorem 1 above) will serve as an example. (The right-to-left side of both theorems is indeed rather straightforward.) As a first step, one relies on axiom A0 to point out that C P (h, e) demonstrably is a function of P(h) and P(e) along with the target quantity relating h and e, in this case the probability ratio itself P(hje)/P(h), so that C P (h, e) ¼ j(P(hje)/P(h), P(h), P(e)). One proceeds to show, however, that were C P (h, e) to actually depend on P(e), it would then give different values for some distinct e 1 and e 2 with P(e 1 ) 6 ¼ P(e 2 ) even if P(hje 1 ) ¼ P(hje 2 ), thus violating axiom A1. So A1 rules out P(e) as a separate relevant variable for C P (h, e) and in fact dictates that C P (h, e) ¼ k(P(hje)/P(h), P(h)). By a similar move, one can now show that, were C P (h, e) to actually depend on P(h), it would then give different values for some distinct h 1 and h 2 with P(h 1 ) 6 ¼ P(h 2 ) even if P(h 1 je)/P(h 1 ) ¼ P(h 2 je)/P(h 2 ), namely-by Bayes's theorem-P(ejh 1 ) ¼ P(ejh 2 ), thus violating axiom A2. So A2 further rules out P(h) as a separate relevant variable for C P (h, e) and in fact dictates that C P (h,e) ¼ f (P(hje)/P(h)). Finally, the strictly increasing behaviour of f easily follows too, once again from A1. Essentially the same pattern of derivation applies in the likelihood ratio proof (Theorem 2 above) and can be exploited in still other cases (see Crupi and Tentori [forthcoming (a) , (b)] for other applications).
As concerns further implications of our current results, let us first take the connection between probability ratio measures and the law of likelihood. This had not escaped notice in the literature (see Fitelson [2007] ). The connection is only partial, however, as shown by consideration of Mortimer's ([1988] , Section 11.1) measure of confirmation (formally equivalent to Suppes's [1970] measure of causal strength as construed by Fitelson and Hitchcock [2011] ):
This quantity does satisfy our axiom A2, i.e. the law of likelihood, while being ordinally divergent from probability ratio measures (see Crupi et al. [2007] , p. 231, for a proof of this divergence). Our Theorem 1 above neatly identifies what more, beyond A2, is necessary and sufficient to isolate probability ratio measures, i.e. axioms A0 and A1 (indeed, Mortimer's measure demonstrably breaks with axiom A1.) Similarly, consider A2*, i.e. modularity for conditionally independent data. Its connection with likelihood ratio measures has itself been repeatedly noticed (see Good [1968] ; Fitelson [2001] ). Yet that principle is also satisfied by a quantity that is ordinally distinct (see again Crupi et al. [2007] Crupi and Tentori [2012] ). In this contribution, we do not enter these debates. We do believe, however, that axiomatizing alternative candidate explications of epistemological concepts fosters insight in their properties and discussion of their implications. So far, it has appeared that such insights come at the cost of accepting mathematical assumptions of continuity that were debatable and yet required for technical reasons. Not so. (ii) x ! 0, by which x ¼ P(hje)/P(h) ! 0, so that P(hje) ! 0, and thus P(h^e) ! 0;
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(iii) x 1/y, by which xy ¼ P(hje) 1, so that P(h^e) P(e), and thus P(:h^e) ! 0;
(iv) x 1/z, by which xz ¼ P(ejh) 1, so that P(h^e) P(h), and thus P(h^:e) ! 0;
(v) x ! (y + z À 1)/yz, by which xyz ¼ P(h^e) ! P(h) + P(e) À 1 ¼ y + z À 1, and thus P(h^e) + P(:h^e) + P(h^:e) 1.
We thus posit j: {(x, y, z) 2 {R + [ {0}} Â (0, 1) 2 j (y + z À 1)/yz x 1/y, 1/z} ! R and denote the domain of j as D j .
Lemma 1.1: For any x, y, z 1 , z 2 such that x 2 R + [ {0}, y, z 1 , z 2 2 (0,1), and (y + z 1 À 1)/yz 1 , (y + z 2 À 1)/yz 2 x 1/y, 1/z 1 , 1/z 2 , there exist h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and P 0 2 P such that
Proof: The equalities in Lemma 1.1 arise from the following scheme of probability assignments: Suppose there exist (x, y, z 1 ), (x, y, z 2 ) 2 D j such that j(x, y, z 1 ) 6 ¼ j(x, y, z 2 ). Then, by Lemma 1.1 and the definition of D j , there exist h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and P 0 2 P such that
¼ z 1 , and P 0 (e 2 ) ¼ z 2 . Clearly, if the latter equalities hold, then
hje 2 ). Thus, there exist h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and P 0 2 P such that
contradicting A1. Conversely, A1 implies that, for any (x, y, z 1 ), (x, y, z 2 ) 2 D j , j(x, y, z 1 ) ¼ j(x, y, z 2 ). So, for A1 to hold, there must exist k such that, for any h, e 2 L c and any P 2 P, C P (h, e) ¼ k(P(hje)/P(h),P(h)) and k(x, y) ¼ j(x, y, z). We thus posit k: {(x, y) 2 {R + [ {0}} Â (0, 1) j x 1/y} ! R and denote the domain of k as D k .
Lemma 1.2: For any x, y 1 , y 2 such that x 2 R + [ {0}, y 1 , y 2 2 (0, 1) and x 1/y 1 , 1/y 2 , there exist h 1 , h 2 , e 2 L c and P 00 2 P such that P 00 (h 1 je)/ P 00 (h 1 ) ¼ P 00 (h 2 je)/P 00 (h 2 ) ¼ x, P 00 (h 1 ) ¼ y 1 , and P 00 (h 2 ) ¼ y 2 .
Proof: Let z 2 (0, 1) be given so that z 1/x, (1 À y 1 )/(1 À xy 1 ), (1 À y 2 )/ (1 À xy 2 ) (as the latter quantities must all be positive, z exists). The equalities in Lemma 1.2 arise from the following scheme of probability assignments: Suppose there exist (x, y 1 ), (x, y 2 ) 2 D k such that k(x, y 1 ) 6 ¼ k(x, y 2 ). Then, by Lemma 1.2 and the definition of D k , there exist h 1 , h 2 , e 2 L c and P 00 2 P such that P 00 (h 1 je)/P 00 (h 1 ) ¼ P 00 (h 2 je)/P 00 (h 2 ) ¼ x, P 00 (h 1 ) ¼ y 1 , and P 00 (h 2 ) ¼ y 2 .
By the probability calculus, if the latter equalities hold, then P 00 (ejh 1 ) ¼ P 00 (ejh 2 ). Thus, there exist h 1 , h 2 , e 2 L c and P 00 2 P such that C P
Conversely, A2 implies that, for any (
So, for A2 to hold, there must exist f such that, for any h, e 2 L c and any P 2 P, C P (h, e) ¼ f (P(hje)/P(h)) and f(x) ¼ k(x, y). We thus posit f : {R + [ {0}} ! R and denote the domain of f as D f . Lemma 1.3: For any x 1 , x 2 2 R + [ {0}, there exist h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and P 000 2 P such that P 000 (hje 1 )/P 000 (h) ¼ x 1 and P 000 (hje 2 )/P 000 (h) ¼ x 2 .
Proof: Let y, z 1 , z 2 2 (0, 1) be given so that y 1/x 1 ,1/x 2 (as the latter quantities must all be positive, y exists), z 1 1/x 1 , (1 À y)/(1 À x 1 y) (as the latter quantities must all be positive, z 1 exists), and z 2 1/x 2 , (1 À y)/(1 À x 2 y) (as the latter quantities must all be positive, z 2 exists). The equalities in Lemma 1.3 arise from the following scheme of probability assignments: Suppose there exist x 1 , x 2 2 D f such that x 1 > x 2 and f (x 1 ) f (x 2 ). Then, by Lemma 1.3 and the definition of D f , there exist h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and P 000 2 P such that P 000 (hje 1 )/P 000 (h) ¼ x 1 and P 000 (hje 2 )/P 000 (h) ¼ x 2 .
Clearly, if the latter equalities hold, then P 000 (hje 1 ) > P 000 (hje 2 ). Thus, there exist h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and P 000 2 P such that C P 000(h, e 1 ) ¼ f(x 1 ) f (x 2 ) ¼ C P 000(h, e 2 ) even if P 000 (hje 1 ) > P 000 (hje 2 ), contradicting A1.
Conversely, A1 implies that, for any
. By a similar argument, A1 also implies that, for any
. So, for A1 to hold, it must be that, for any h, e 2 L c and any P 2 P, C P (h, e) ¼ f(P(hje)/P(h)) and f is a strictly increasing function. « Proof of Theorem 2: A0-A2* iff there exists a strictly increasing function, f, such that C P ðh, eÞ ¼ f PðejhÞ Pðej:hÞ .
The proof provided concerns the left-to-right implication in the theorem (verification of the right-to-left implication is straightforward).
Notice that 
PðeÞ
As a consequence, by A0, there exist a function j such that, for any h, e 2 L c and any P 2 P, C P (h, e) ¼ j(P(ejh)/P(ej:h), P(h), P(e)). With no loss of generality, we will convey probabilistic coherence and regularity by constraining the domain of j to include triplets of values (x, y, z) such that the following conditions are jointly satisfied:
(ii) x ! 0, by which xy/(xy + (1 À y)) ¼ P(hje) ! 0, and thus P(h^e) ! 0; (iii) 0 < y < 1, by which xy/(xy + (1 À y)) ¼ P(hje) 1, so that P(h^e) P(e), and thus P(:h^e) ! 0;
(iv) (z y) _ (x (1 À y)/(z À y)), by which xz/(xy + (1 À y)) ¼ P(ejh) 1, so that P(h^e) P(h), and thus P(h^:e) ! 0;
(v) x ! (y + z À 1)/y, by which z/(xy + (1 À y)) ¼ P(ej:h) 1, so that P(:h^e) 1 À P(h), and thus P(h^e) + P(:h^e) + P(h^:e) 1.
We thus posit j: {(x, y, z) 2 {{R + [ {0}} Â (0, 1) 2 j (y + z À 1)/y x and ((z y) _ (x (1 À y)/(z À y)))} ! R and denote the domain of j as D j .
Lemma 2.1: For any x,y,z 1 ,z 2 such that x 2 R + [ {0}, y, z 1 , z 2 2 (0, 1),
, there exist h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and P 0 2 P such that P 0 (e 1 jh)/P 0 (e 1 j:h) ¼ P 0 (e 2 jh)/P 0 (e 2 j:h) ¼ x, P 0 (h) ¼ y, P 0 (e 1 ) ¼ z 1 , and P 0 (e 2 ) ¼ z 2 .
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Proof: The equalities in Lemma 2.1 arise from the following scheme of probability assignments: Suppose there exist (x, y, z 1 ), (x, y, z 2 ) 2 D j such that j(x, y, z 1 ) 6 ¼ j(x, y, z 2 ). Then, by Lemma 2.1 and the definition of D j , there exist h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and P 0 2 P such that P 0 (e 1 jh)/P 0 (e 1 j:h) ¼ P 0 (e 2 jh)/P 0 (e 2 j:h) ¼ x, P 0 (h) ¼ y, P 0 (e 1 ) ¼ z 1 , and P 0 (e 2 ) ¼ z 2 . By the probability calculus, if the latter equalities hold, then P 0 (hje 1 ) ¼ P 0 (hje 2 ). Thus, there exist h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and P 0 2 P such that
contradicting A1. Conversely, A1 implies that, for any (x, y, z 1 ), (x, y, z 2 ) 2 D j , j(x, y, z 1 ) ¼ j(x, y, z 2 ). So, for A1 to hold, there must exist k such that, for any h, e 2 L c and any
Lemma 2.2: For any x, y 1 , y 2 such that x 2 R + [ {0} and y 1 , y 2 2 (0, 1), there exist h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and P 00 2 P such that P 00 (e 1 jh)/P 00 (e 1 j:h) ¼ x, P 00 (e 1 jh) ¼ P 00 (e 1 jh^e 2 ), P 00 (e 1 j:h) ¼ P 00 (e 1 j:h^e 2 ), P 00 (h) ¼ y 1 , and P 00 (hje 2 ) ¼ y 2 .
Proof: Let z 1 , z 2 2 (0, 1) be given so that z 1 y 1 , xy 1 + (1 À y 1 ) (as the latter quantities must all be positive, z 1 exists) and z 2 y 1 /y 2 , (1 À y 1 )/(1 À y 2 ) (as the latter quantities must all be positive, z 2 exists). The equalities in Lemma 2.2 arise from the following scheme of probability assignments: Suppose there exist (x, y 1 ), (x, y 2 ) 2 D k such that k(x, y 1 ) 6 ¼ k(x, y 2 ). Then, by Lemma 2.2 and the definition of D k , there exists h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and P 00 2 P such that P 00 (e 1 jh)/P 00 (e 1 j:h) ¼ x, P 00 (e 1 jh) ¼ P 00 (e 1 jh^e 2 ), P 00 (e 1 j:h) ¼ P 00 (e 1 j:h^e 2 ), P 00 (h) ¼ y 1 , and P 00 (hje 2 ) ¼ y 2 . Clearly, if the latter equalities hold, then P 00 (e 1 j ± h) ¼ P 00 (e 1 j±h^e 2 ). Thus, there exist h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and P 00 2 P such that C P 00(h, e 1 ) ¼ k(x, y 1 ) 6 ¼ k(x, y 2 ) ¼ C P 00 (h, e 1 je 2 ) even if P 00 (e 1 j±h) ¼ P 00 (e 1 j±h^e 2 ), contradicting A2*. Conversely, A2* implies that, for any Vincenzo Crupi et al.
(x, y 1 ), (x, y 2 ) 2 D k , k(x, y 1 ) ¼ k(x, y 2 ). So, for A2* to hold, there must exist f such that, for any h, e 2 L c and any P 2 P, C P (h, e) ¼ f(P(ejh)/P(ej:h)) and f(x) ¼ k(x, y). We thus posit f: {R + [ {0}} ! R and denote the domain of f as D f .
Lemma 2.3: For any x 1 , x 2 2 R + [ {0}, there exist h, e 1 , e 2 2 L c and P 000 2 P such that P 000 (e 1 jh)/P 000 (e 1 j:h) ¼ x 1 and P 000 (e 2 jh)/P 000 (e 2 j:h) ¼ x 2 .
Proof: Let y, z 1 , z 2 2 (0, 1) be given so that z 1 y, x 1 y + (1 À y) (as the latter quantities must all be positive, z 1 exists) and z 2 y, x 2 y + (1 À y) (as the latter quantities must all be positive, z 2 exists). The equalities in Lemma 2.3 arise from the following scheme of probability assignments:
